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Balancing Teachers' Collective Bargaining
Rights with the Interests of School




Prior to 1970, teacher strikes nationwide were mere curiosities that
occurred infrequently.' Indeed, public employees in Pennsylvania,
including teachers, were not permitted to strike.2 Gradually, however,
teacher strikes became more frequent.' This trend was largely due to an
increase in teacher militancy that resulted from widespread professional
dissatisfaction with teacher wages, national and local campaigns to
organize teachers, social demands for more years of schooling, and
teacher shortages.4
In response to increased teacher militancy and the resultant strikes,
Pennsylvania sponsored the Leon Hickman Commission to study public
sector employee labor relations.5 Based on the recommendations of the
Commission, Pennsylvania enacted Act 1956 which afforded most public
employees7 the right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike The
*Associate Attorney, Duane Morris & Heckscher, Harrisburg, PA. The author thanks Professor
Robert Rains at The Dickinson School of Law and Patricia Crawford, Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board for their guidance during preparation of this article.
I. DAVID L. COLTON & EDITH E. GRABER, TEACHER STRiKEs AND THE COURTS 3 (1982).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (1992), repealed in part by Public Employe Relations Act,
Pub. L. No. 195, § 2201, 1970 PA. LAws 563, 584 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 1101.2201
(1991)).
3. COLTON & GRABER, supra note 1, at 1. While the number of teacher strikes averaged only
three per year in the 1950s, by the first half of the 1970s teacher strikes were occurring at a rate of
more than 130 per year. Id. (citing GOV'T EMPLOYE RELATIONS REPORT (Wash., D.C.: Bureau of
Nat'l Affairs, July 21, 1980, 871:18)). In the 1979-80 school year, teacher strikes reached an all-time
high with 242 teacher strikes nationwide. Id.
4. COLTON & GRABER, supra note I, at 3.
5. See Raymond L. Hogler, Teacher Strikes in Pennsylvania: A Proposed Alternative, 90
DICK. L. REV. 387, 394 (1985).
6. Public Employe Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 195, 1970 PA. LAws 563 (codified as amended
at Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 1101.100 to .2301 (1991)) [hereinafter Act 195].
7. Id. § 1101.1101. Strikes by guards or courtemployees are prohibited. Id. § 1101.1001.
8. Id. § 1101.1003. Act 195 permits teachers to strike after exhaustion of negotiations and
mediation procedures.
If a strike by public employees occurs after the collective bargaining processes set
forth in sections 801 and 802 of Article VIII of this act have been completely utilized and
exhausted, it shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear and
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legislature intended for Act 195 to promote harmonious relationships
between public employers9 and their employees." These relationships,
however, were not the only consideration. The legislature also
recognized that the citizens had a right to "keep inviolate the guarantees
for their health, safety and welfare.""
Contrary to the purpose of Act 195, relations between public
employers and employees did not improve and the number of strikes
increased.' In fact, Pennsylvania became the government employee
strike capital of the country, with the majority of strikes occurring in the
public education sector. 3 From 1970 to 1988, Pennsylvania was the
site of one of every five public school strikes in the United States. 4
Further, in the years 1982 and 1986, Pennsylvania suffered one out of
every three public school strikes nationwide. 5 Moreover, the strikes
affected large numbers of students.'6 Additionally, by the mid-1980's,
teachers were engaging in selective strikes, 7 a particularly disruptive
present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. The definition of,"public employer" under Act 195 includes "the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, its political subdivisions including school districts, any officer board, commission,
agency, authority, or instrumentality thereof, and any nonprofit organization or institution and any
charitable, religious, scientific, literary, recreational, health, educational or welfare institution
receiving grants or appropriations from local, State-or Federal governments." PA. STAT. ANN., tit
43, § 1101.301(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Charles W. Baird, Pennsylvania's Act 195: Twenty Years of Folly, 10 GOV'T. UNION
RE ViEw , 21 (Summer 1989).
13. Id. at 21.
14. Id. (citing Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n, 26 Information Legislative Service 30,4 (July
22, 1988)).
15. Id. See also Around the Nation - Teachers on Strike, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1986 at Al.
"Classes for almost 118,000 students in 33 public school districts across seven states were canceled
as more than 7,200 teachers were on strike. Pennsylvania was the hardest hit with walkouts in 14
districts by 3,400 teachers leaving 53,000 students without regular instruction." Id.
16. Baird, supra note 12 (citing Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n, 24 Information Legislation
Service, 31, 4 (Aug. 8, 1986)). For example, in the 1980-81 school year, 374,617 Pennsylvania
students were affected by teachers' strikes and teachers were idle for 364,893 days. Id. While these
numbers decreased by the 1988-89 school year with 70,796 students affected and 64,254 idle
employee days, the impact of teachers' strikes continues to be substantial. Id. (citing Pennsylvania
School Boards Association Inc., 26 Information Legislation Service 30, 4 (July 22, 1988)).
17. 1991 PA. LEGIs. J.-Senate, Vol. 2, at 1135. "Although teachers have had the right to
strike under Act 195 since its inception, the selective strike has been a new weapon in the arsenal
of disruptive action by the PSEA." Id. (statements of Senator Shaffer). In addition, Senator Shaffer
stated
"[The so-called hit and run or selective strikes accounted for 22 percent of the total
strikes in Pennsylvania in 1988 .... [l]n the.., school year 1990-91, there were a total
of 16 professional work stoppages by teachers in Pennsylvania, and of those 5, or 31%,
were of the so-called selective or hit and run variety."
TEACHERS' COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
strike tool"8 that enabled teachers to refuse to work at selected times. 9
Thus, soon after the enactment of Act 195, it became apparent that the
legislature had opened a Pandora's Box by giving teachers the right to
strike.
Almost immediately after the enactment of Act 195, the legislature
and the judiciary began to evaluate the Act in various ways. In 1976, the
Commonwealth sponsored the Jones Commission to evaluate the
legislation.2° The Commission ultimately recommended that the law
regarding teacher strikes should remain unchanged.2' Additionally, the
judiciary struggled to reconcile the 180-day school year requirement 2
with the teachers' right to strike in the absence of a "clear and present
Id.
18. "[T]he selective strike is a new tool ... I and is indeed in my judgment the most violently
anti-education and truly mean-spirited tool in the arsenal today of striking." 1991 PA. LEGIS.
J.-Senate, Vol. 2, at 1135 (statements of Senator Shaffer).
19. Id. There are various forms of selective strikes, including selected days, hours, activities
and in-class slowdowns. Under selected day strikes, teacher refuse to work on certain days, usually
giving school districts and parents little advance notice. Id. at 1136. Often PSEA would announce
the strike on the 11:00 o'clock news the night before the strike, making it difficult for school districts
to find substitutes and for parent to find alternative child care arrangements. Id. at 1136 (citing B.
Waldman, Neshannock Sch. Bd. Member, Senate Committee on Education, who stated, "Leaving
notification to the last minute, it was obvious that one of the intentions of the PSEA was to create
hardships within working families.").
Under the selected hours strike, teachers would work part of the day and take off the rest of
the day. Id. This method of selective strike was particularly disruptive because school districts
could not find substitutes which disrupted the busing program and prevented schools from providing
safe transportation home. Id. In addition, if busing could be arranged and students were bused
home, many students returned to empty homes since working parents had not had time to make
adequate, safe child-care arrangements. 1991 PA. LEGis. J.-Senate, Vol. 2, at 1136.
Under selected activities strikes, teachers would refuse to participate in previously scheduled
school activities such as athletic programs, band practice and performances or open houses. Id.
Finally, under in-class slowdowns, teachers would present material at a slower pace or discuss strike
activities rather than teaching. Id.
In light of the disruptive effects on school districts, parents and students, it is not surprising
that Senator Shaffer compared selective strikes to a "gorilla or a jungle warfare tactic used against
our children..." Id.
20. Governor's Study Commission on Public Employee Relations, Recommendation for
Legislative and Administrative Change to the Public Sector Collective Bargaining Laws of
Pennsylvania 3, 28 (1978) [hereinafter Jones Commission Report].
21. Jones Commission Report, supra note 20. However, a minority of Commission members
proposed elimination of the teachers' right to strike and recommended that compulsory binding
arbitration be substituted as the method of impasse resolution. Id. at 31-32. The minority contended
that granting teachers the right to strike created an impermissible conflict with the right of students
to a "'thorough and efficient education."' Id. at 32. This conflict, the minority reasoned, could only
be resolved by eliminating the right to strike. Id.
22. The Public School Code of 1949 provides: "All public kindergartens, elementary and
secondary schools shall be kept open each school year for at least one hundred eighty (180) days of
instruction for pupils." Public School Code, Pub. L. No. 14, 1949 PA. LAws 30 (codified as
amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (1992)).
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danger to the health, safety or welfare of the public."23  Finally, the
legislature made unsuccessful attempts to modify Act 195 on numerous
occasions.24 Faced with continuing pressure from taxpayers, parents,
school boards, and the state's education association, the legislature finally
responded by enacting Act 88 in 1992.25
Representing a compromise between legislators, educators and school
boards, Act 88 was designed to reduce the number and length of teacher
strikes.26 Whether this laudable purpose has been achieved is uncertain
since the legislation is so recent. Teacher strikes have declined since the
enactment of Act 88.27 However, despite this encouraging news,
Pennsylvania still had over forty per cent of all public school strikes
occurring throughout the nation in 1993.28 In light of this fact, Act 88
should not be the final chapter on teacher strikes in Pennsylvania.
Part II of this Article will discuss the provisions of Act 195 that are
pertinent to teacher strikes and the corresponding case law. Additionally,
part II will examine the scope of injunctive relief under Act 195, and the
constitutionality of the legislature's decision to afford teachers the right
to strike. Part III analyzes the dispute resolution procedures employed
by Act 88 and reveals some of the Act's weaknesses. In concluding, this
Article sets forth a few proposals for improving relations between public
employers and teachers.
23. See supra note 8.
24. See Hogler, supra note 5, at 393. During the 1983 legislative session fifteen bills were
proposed to modify the negotiations process including suggestions such as altering timetables,
abolishing strikes and substituting binding arbitration, and permitting residents of affected school
districts to seek injunctions. Id. Ultimately, the legislature failed to enact any of the proposals. Id.
Again, in 1984, another Senate task force recommended various changes in the educational
bargaining procedures. Id. The legislature, however, failed to enact any of the proposed measures.
Id.
25. Public School Code, Pub. L. No. 88, 1992 PA. LAws 403 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11.1 101-A to 11-1172-A (Supp. 1994)) [hereinafter Act 88].
26. Gov. Casey Signs Bill to Reduce and Shorten Teacher Strikes, PR Newswire, July 10, 1992
available in, LEXIS, News Library, WIREs file. Governor Casey stated, "This legislation provides
new and important protections against prolonged public school strikes." Id.
27. State Sees Fewest School Strikes in Seven Years, UPI, July 19, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, WIRES file. "There were fewer public school strikes in Pennsylvania this year than
in any year since 1986. A study ... [indicates] there were 20 teacher strikes in the 1992-1993
school year, down from 36 last year, and the smallest number since the 18 in 1985-1986." Id. In
addition, the length of the strikes was down from an average of 14 days since 1971 to 10 days in the
1992-93 school year. Id.
28. Id.
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II. Discussion of Act 195
Prior to the enactment of Act 195, Pennsylvania public employees,
including teachers, did not have the right to bargain collectively with
their employers or have the right to strike.29 However, despite the fact
that strikes were illegal, public employees were striking.3" These illegal
strikes, work stoppages, or withdrawals of services3  by public
employees provided the impetus for the state legislature to develop clear
statutory policies.32 Consequently, the legislature passed Act 195,
reasoning that by providing impasse resolution procedures, which
included the right to strike, it could guide and control the labor activities
that were already occurring.33
A. Overview of Dispute Resolution Procedures
The impasse"4  resolution procedures of Act 195 provide a
framework for labor negotiations. This framework incorporates both
mediation and factfinding." Additionally, as a final step of impasse
resolution, the Act also provides public employees with the right to strike.
Mediation is the first step in impasse resolution under Act 195. If
an impasse exists after a reasonable period of negotiation, the parties have
29. See supra text accompanying note 2.
30. 1970 PA. LEGiS. J.-Senate, Vol. 1, at 1323 (statements of Senator Frame) "Whether itwas
the 'blu flu' absence of Detroit policemen [or] the withdrawal of services in some twenty-one school
districts of Pennsylvania, during the last school year. . . all of these evidenced that... these matters
are going to occur and do occur." Id.
31. As defined in Act 195,
"Strike" means concerted action in falling to report for duty, the wilful absence from
one's position, the stoppage of work, slowdown or the abstinence in whole or in part from
the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment for the purpose of
inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation or the rights,
privileges or obligations of employment.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(9) (1991).
32. 1970 PA. LEIos. J.-Senate, Vol. 1, at 1323 (statements of Senator Frame). Senator Frame
stated, "Almost everyone who has worked in this field ... has agreed that it was essential that the
1947 Public Employees' Act of Pennsylvania... which has proven to be unenforceable [must] be
withdrawn." Id.
33. Hogler, supra note 5, at 389 n.10 (citing Governor's Commission to Revise the Public
Employee Law of Pennsylvania, Report and Recommendations, 251 Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
E-1, E-3 (1968)[hereinafrer The Hickman Report]). "The collective bargaining process will be
strengthened if this qualified right to strike is recognized. It will be some curb on the possible
intransigence of an employer; and the limitation on the right to strike will serve notice on the
employee that there are limits to the hardships that he can impose." Id.
34. "'Impasse' shall mean the failure of an employer and an employe organization to reach an
agreement in the course of negotiations." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101-A (Supp. 1994).
35. Act 195 also permits the parties to engage in outside, voluntary binding arbitration. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.804 (1991) (stating that "[n]othing in [the] article shall prevent the parties
from submitting to voluntary binding arbitration.").
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the option of submitting to mediation, whereby mediators assist them in
reaching an agreement.36 However, if no agreement is reached within
twenty-one days after the commencement of negotiations, but in no event
later than one hundred fifty days prior to the budget submission date,37
the parties must request the services of a mediator." Mediation
continues until the parties reach an agreement.39 If, however, an
agreement is not reached within twenty days after the commencement of
mediation, or in no event later than one hundred thirty days prior to the
budget submission date, the Bureau of Mediation must notify the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board ("PLRB").
The PLRB has broad powers to perform the duties specifically
authorized in Act 195.40 Such powers include the appointment of
members of the factfinding panels. These panels are comprised of
qualified persons who are broadly representative of the public, and who
are available to serve as members of the factfinding panels.4 ' The
PLRB has discretion to appoint a factfinding panel, which conducts
hearings, issues subpoenas, and issues a nonbinding report of
recommendations.42  The parties may either accept or reject the
factfinders' recommendations. However, upon rejection, the panel must
publish its findings and recommendations.43
Finally, once the collective bargaining processes have been utilized
and exhausted, the public employees may strike provided the strike does
not create a "clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or
36. Id. § 1101.801.
37. The "budget submission date" is the date by which, "under law or practice a public
employer's proposed budget, or budget containing proposed expenditures applicable to such public
employer is submitted to the Legislature or other similar body for final action." Id. § 1101.301(12).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.801 (1991). Act 195 does not require a minimum number
of mediators. Pennsylvania State Education Association, Act 195: A Reference Manual 97 (March
11, 1992) (on file with the Dickinson Law Review). In 1990, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation
employed approximately two dozen mediators. Id. In contrast, Act 88 specifies that the bureau
employ no less than 25 mediators. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § I1- 121-A(b) (Supp. 1994). For
further information concerning mediation, see generally, W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1971) (detailing the mediation process); D. KLOB, THE MEDIATORS
(1983) (comparing mediation in the private and public sectors).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.802 (1991). Refusal by either party to submit to mediation
or factfinding constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith. Id. § 1101.803.
40. Id. § 1101.501.
41. Id. § 1101.503.
42. Id. § 1101.802(2). It is noteworthy that Act 195 does not expressly provide for factfinding.
Rather, the Act allows the PLRB to determine whether factfinding is appropriate following a
determination by the mediator that the dispute is unresolved. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802
(1991). The PLRB is never required to justify its decision in cases where it does not order
factfinding.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802(2) (1991).
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welfare of the public."M If the public employer believes that the strike
exceeds the limits set by the legislature, the employer may initiate an
action for equitable relief including, but not limited to, injunctive
relief.
43
B. Limitations on the Right to Strike
The language of Act 195 that pertains to strikes states that a legal
strike "shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear
and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the
public."'46 This broad language inevitably has led to judicial hand-
wringing and inconsistent results. Although the "clear and present
danger" standard had been applied by the United States Supreme Court
in cases involving government interference with First Amendment
rights,4  Pennsylvania courts had never applied this standard to cases
involving public employee strikes.
Consequently, in Armstrong Education Association v. Armstrong
School District,48 the commonwealth court first transposed the standard
from the First Amendment cases to the public employee strike cases. 9
The court reached several conclusions following a discussion of the
difficulties involved in determining what constituted a "clear and present
danger" under Act 195. First, in order for a strike to present a clear and
present danger to the health, safety or welfare of the public, a court must
find that the danger or threat was real or actual and that a strong
44. Id. § 1101.1003.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 1101.1003.
47. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Communist Party of the United States
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 351
U.S. 115 (1956).
48. 291 A.2d 120 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972). After a twelve day teachers' strike, the trial court
issued an injunction holding that a clear and present danger to the public existed. Id. at 122. This
conclusion was supported by evidence of the strained atmosphere in the community and that the
twelve missed school days would have to be made up. Id. The Education Association appealed from
the order. Id.
49. Id. The court used the definition of clear and present danger as it was stated in Communist
Party of the United States, 223 F.2d at 544.
The "clear" in that epigram is not limited to a threat indubitably etched in every
microscopic detail. It includes that which is not speculative but real, not imagined but
actual. The "present" in the epigram is not restricted to the climatically imminent. It
includes that which exists as contrasted with that which does not yet exist and that which
has ceased to exist.
Armstrong, 291 A.2d at 123-24.
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likelihood existed that it would occur.50 Second, the threat or danger
must not be one that is normally incident to a strike."'
In Armstrong, the court held that the harassment and disruption in
the community met the clear and present standard, but that the strike
posed no real danger or threat to the public.52 More importantly, the
court stated that there would be proper grounds for enjoining the strike
if the District would lose state subsidies because the strike threatened the
180-day requirement.53 However, because only twelve days were lost
and the 180-day requirement could still be satisfied, the court concluded
that there was no clear and present danger or threat with respect to the
loss of school subsidies.5 4
The court acknowledged that the strike had caused disruption and
inconvenience. Nevertheless, because these problems were typical of any
teacher strike, the court held that they did not pose a sufficient threat to
warrant issuing an injunction and that a decision to the contrary would
abrogate the right of teachers to strike.55  The court reasoned: "By
enacting Act 195 which authorizes such strikes, the Legislature .. .
indicated its willingness to accept certain inconveniences, for such are
inevitable, but it obviously intended to draw the line at those which pose
a danger to the public health, safety or welfare."56
A year later, in Philadelphia Federation of Teachers v. Ross,57 the
court relied on several facts to support the trial court's decision that a
strike created a "clear and present danger." First, the strike might have
resulted in increased gang activity which would have required a
substantial increase in costs of police protection. Second, the debt-ridden
school district was in danger of losing state aid. Finally, the District
might not be able to make up the lost days. 8
Although the Ross majority presented a somewhat compelling
argument for enjoining a teachers' strike, Judge Blatt vigorously dissented
50. Id. at 124.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Armstrong, 291 A.2d at 125.
54. Id. at 124-25.
55. Id. at 124. "If we were to say that such inconveniences, which necessarily accompany any
strike by school teachers from its very inception, are proper grounds for enjoining such a strike, we
would in fact be nullifying the right to strike granted to school teachers by the legislature in Act
195." Id.
56. Id. See also Id. at 124 n.3 (citing a law review article that gives reasons why a continued
strike could present a clear and present danger).
57. 301 A.2d 405 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
58. Id. at 410.
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because the danger or threat was a mere potential.59 Judge Blatt noted
that the trial court issued the injunction only four days after the strike had
begun.60 Moreover, testimony of mere potential extra expense to
increase security forces and potential undocumented harm to
underachieving students was merely speculative and not indicative of an
actual and present threat or harm.6'
As foreshadowed by the strong dissent in Ross, throughout the 1970s
and 1980s the commonwealth court continued to speak in a fractured
voice with respect to the "clear and present danger" standard. By the late
1980s, however, the 180-day requirement clearly had become the
measuring stick used by courts to decide whether a teacher strike
constituted a "clear and present danger. '62 There are two probable
reasons for this trend. First, the 180-day requirement is an unbending
regulation. School districts must comply with the Public School Code63
which mandates a minimum of 180 days of instruction regardless of any
disruption caused by a strike." Second, a school district stands to lose
considerable sums of revenue in the form of state subsidy payments for
each day that it falls short of the mandated 180-days of instruction.6"
59. Id. at 414 (Blatt, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. E.g. Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n. v. Sch. Dist. of Bristol Township, 322 A.2d 767 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974) (Mencer, J. dissenting). The court held that the threatened loss of state subsidies
because of the failure of the schools to operate for the required time would constitute a danger
sufficient to enjoin a strike. Id. at 770. The court cautioned, however, that its opinion should not
be read to mean that mere loss or threatened loss of subsidies alone would be sufficient to warrant
an injunction, or that the legislature intended to put a limit on the number of days that a strike might
last. Id. But see Bethel Park Sch. Dist v. Bethel Park Fed'n of Teachers, 135 PGH. L.J. 127 (C.P.
Alleg. Co. 1986). Judge Narick held that a "clear and present danger" was not created when a
teachers' strike prevents a school district from providing 180 days of instruction and the district faces
the potential loss of state subsidies. Id. at 132. The court reasoned that a contrary ruling would
mean that the school board is assured that its position in negotiations will prevail if only it can hold
out long enough to encroach into the 180-day requirement. Id. at 133-34.
63. Public School Code, Pub. L. No. 14, 1949 PA. LAws 30 (codified as amended at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 24, § 15-1501 (1991)). "All public kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools shall
be kept open each school year for at least one hundred eighty (180) days of instruction for pupils."
Id.
64. Scanlon v. Mount Union Area Bd. of Sch. Directors, 415 A.2d 96 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980),
affd, 45 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1982). The court in Scanlon held that school districts had to comply with
the 180-day requirement regardless of any strike activity. Id. at 98. In reaching this conclusion, the
court examined sections 520 and 520.1 of the Public School Code, which addressed situations such
as war or unexpected emergencies where school boards might be unable to comply with the 180-day
requirement Id. at 99. The court held that in these specified circumstances, boards could effectuate
certain departures from the code. Id. However, the 180-day requirement could not be affected. Id.
65. See, e.g., Pennsbury Sch. Dist v. Dep't of Educ., 422 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1980); Bristol
Township Educ. Ass'n. v. Sch. Dist. of Bristol Township, 322 A.2d 767, 770 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1974).
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In an effort to reconcile the 180-day requirement with the teachers'
right to strike, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Jersey Shore
Area School District v. Jersey Shore Education Association."" The court
held that "the loss of state education subsidies for failing to schedule 180
days of instruction alone does not constitute a 'clear and present
danger."' 7 In addition to the loss of state subsidies, the court in Jersey
Shore considered various other facts such as the deleterious effect of the
strike on students' SAT scores, the difficulty in determining students'
remedial needs, the deprivation of eligible students of a free hot lunch,
and the disadvantage to seniors with respect to college application
deadlines and guidance services.' Based on the totality of the
circumstances of which the loss of state subsidies was but one factor, the
court concluded that the strike constituted a clear and present danger.69
Mindful not to legislate judicially a 180-day limit to the teachers' right
to strike, the court stated that if the legislature wanted to impose such a
limitation, it could promulgate further legislation.7°
Eventually, the legislature enacted Act 88 and limited the teachers'
right to strike where the strike impinged upon the 180-day
requirement.7' Thus, the importance of the "clear and present danger"
standard as it relates to teachers strikes has diminished. Nevertheless,
there may be situations where a school district seeks an injunction when
the 180-day requirement is not threatened, but the strike still poses a
"clear and present danger." Although such a case has not yet arisen, in
Pennridge School District v. Pennridge Education Association,72 a
common pleas court held that, even though the strike could not be
enjoined under Act 88 because it did not threaten the 180-day
66. 548 A.2d 1202 (Pa. 1988).
67. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1205.
69. Id. at 1207.
70. Id. at 1207 n.9. The court stated,
We resist the facile temptation to legislate judicially a 180-day limit to the teachers'
right to strike. We leave it to the legislature, well aware of the requisites of the Public
School Code when it enacted PERA, to decide whether such a limit should be imposed.
Until that time, we shall consider the length of the instructional calendar and the loss of
state funding as but one factor in the proper issuance of an injunction.
Jersey Shore Area Sch. Dist., 548 A.2d at 1207 n.9.
71. Public School Code, Pub. L. No. 88, 1992 PA. LAws 403 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11.1101-A to 11-1172-A (Supp. 1994). "When an employe organization is
on strike for an extended period that would not permit the school entity to provide the period of
instruction required by section 1501 by June 30, the Secretary of Education may initiate ...
appropriate injunctive proceedings providing for the required period of instruction." Id. § 11- 1161 -A.
72. No. 93-8787-13-5 (C.P. Bucks Co. Nov. 9, 1993).
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requirement, it could be enjoined under Act 195 if the strike constituted
a clear and present danger.73
C. Scope of Injunctive Relief Under Act 195
Under Act 195, the public employer may seek to enjoin a prohibited
strike by initiating "an action for equitable relief including but not limited
to appropriate injunctions."74  Despite the seemingly clear statutory
language, courts have been inconsistent in fashioning the injunctive
remedy. For example, some courts have limited the injunctive remedy
to ordering the teachers to return to work." Others, however, have
gone further and have ordered mandatory binding arbitration where the
parties were required to bargain at specified times and places until an
agreement was reached.76
In Armstrong School District v. Armstrong Education Association
(Armstrong II),77 an early case which delineated the scope of the
injunctive remedy, the court held that under Act 195 the equity
jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania court was limited to the powers that the
statute granted.78 The court reasoned that although Act 195 gave the
court the power to end a public employees' strike, it did not give the
court the power to impose binding arbitration. 79  For nearly two
decades, courts followed the Armstrong II decision."
73. Id., slip op. at 9. Act 88 was intended to supplant Act 195. See Reichly By Wall v. North
Penn Sch. Dist., 626 A.2d 123, 126 n.3 (Pa. 1993) (stating that Act 88 "effectively removed public
educators from the scope of PERA [Act 195]"). Nonetheless, Act 195 may retain significance in
situations which are not addressed or contradicted by Act 88. See supra text accompanying note 67.
See also Act 88 Statutory and Historical Notes, Section 6 (stating that Act 195 is to be read "in pari
materia with [Act 88] but is repealed insofar as it is clearly inconsistent with [Act 881").
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (1991).
75. See, e.g., Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n. v. Sch. Dist. of Bristol Township, 322 A.2d 767
(Pa. Commw. Ct 1974).
76. Armstrong Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n., 595 A. 2d 1139 (Pa. 1991); Bethel Park
Sch. Dist. v. Bethel Park Fed'n of Teachers, 128 Pgh. L.J. 100 (C.P. Alleg. Co. 1980) rev'd, 414
A.2d 145 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
77. 291 A.2d 125 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1972). The facts of Armstrong lare as follows: After
a second strike, the trial court issued an injunction ordering all striking teachers to return to work.
Id. at 126. Although the parties resumed collective bargaining, they were unable to reach an
agreement Id. Thereafter, the court, on its own motion, ordered the parties to engage in binding
arbitration, submit the findings to the court, and formally entered the findings as a court order. Id.
at 127. The District appealed to the Commonwealth Court contending that the lower court lacked
the power to order binding arbitration. Id. Holding that the trial court had exceeded the scope of
its authority, the Commonwealth Court reversed the order of the Court of Common Pleas. Armstrong
Sch. Dist., 291 A.2d at 127.
78. Armstrong Sch. Dist., 291 A.2d at 127.
79. Id. at 128.
80. E.g., Armstrong Educ. Ass'n. v. Armstrong Sch. Dist., 542 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988), rev'd, 595 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1991). The Commonwealth Court held that although the trial court
99 DICKINSoN LAW REVIEW FALL 1994
Signaling a radical departure from prior case law, in Armstrong
School District v. Armstrong Education Association(1991),8m the
supreme court rejected Armstrong II and held that trial courts may go
beyond issuing injunctions that require teachers to return to work, and
may order the parties to engage in collective bargaining. 2 The court
examined the language of Act 195 that granted courts the power to issue
"equitable relief including but not limited to appropriate injunctions"8 3
and concluded that the language of the Act provided courts explicit
authority to issue injunctions, and implied authority to impose reasonable
regulations and conditions upon the injunction. 4 Such "reasonable
regulations" included mandatory binding arbitration wherein the parties
are required to engage in daily negotiating sessions until an agreement is
reached. 5
In an ardent dissent, Justice Zappala argued that the court's broad
interpretation of the language in section 1003" was misplaced.86 Rather
than granting to the courts "unfettered discretion to act as a super-
arbiter," he contended that the language was intended only to clarify that
injunctive relief was permitted."
Prior to the supreme court's decision in Armstrong (1991), trial
courts had continually pressed for the expansion of equitable relief under
Act 195 despite the prior decisions that limited such relief.8"
Undoubtedly, courts utilize the broader injunctive remedies because they
are faced with extremely difficult and volatile community situations.
While teachers are on strike, students are idle, parents are imposed upon
to find alternative child care or miss work, and taxpayers are angry at the
could act to end the strike, it exceeded the scope of its equitable powers by imposing judicial
settlement on the parties. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n., 542 A.2d at 1050. Rather than relying on the
courts to impose bargaining on the parties, the court suggested that the parties look to the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) for relief. Id.
81. 595 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1991).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1142 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (1991)) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1142.
85. Id. at 1143.
86. Armstrong Sch. Dist., 595 A.2d at 114445 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1145. Justice Zappala stated, "Section 1003 of the Act does not have to be interpreted
so as to permit the court to wield power to compel attendance and to direct the hours of negotiation
in order to preserve the court's authority to grant equitable relief. Negotiation requires finesse, not
a judicial steamroller." Id.
88. In Armstrong Educ. Ass'n. v. Armstrong Sch. Dist, 542 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988), the Pennsylvania School Board Association (PSBA) filed an amicus brief in which they
indicated twenty-six instances between the 1978-79 school year and the 1986-87 school year where
school districts were subjected to orders requiring them to bargain as a condition of the injunction.
ld. at 1050 n.5.
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possibility of higher taxes. 9  In these situations, court ordered
negotiations may seem reasonable. However, broad equitable relief, such
as court ordered mandatory binding arbitration, may well be beyond the
scope of the legislature's intent when it permitted the public employer to
seek equitable relief "including but not limited to appropriate
injunctions." °
D. Constitutional Challenges to Act 195
Expressing complete dissatisfaction with Act 195, some courts have
declared it unconstitutional. 9' These courts have held that when the
legislature gave teachers the right to strike, it breached the constitutional
mandate to provide to the students a thorough and efficient system of
public schools.92 However, Pennsylvania's highest court has upheld the
constitutionality of Act 195.93
89. Armstrong School Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n (Armstrong 11), 291 A.2d 125 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1972). The court discussed the dilemma facing the trial courts and stated:
It is clear that the lower court was faced with a most difficult problem. The parties
appeared to be at a total impasse, with little likelihood of being able to work out a
compromise. Community feeling was running high and the court believed that the quality
of education ... had already suffered and would suffer more if the dispute continued.
In view of these circumstances, the rational course may well have been to submit the
matter to binding arbitration.
Id. at 127.
90. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. In any case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Armstrong Sch. Dist, 595 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1991), as to the scope of
injunctive relief, should give to trial courts an additional tool for resolving teacher strikes by ordering
the parties to bargain. Indeed, a recent decision, Sec. of Education v. Bethel Park Fed'n of Teachers,
illustrates how far a creative court might press in fashioning injunctive relief. Sec. of Education v.
Bethel Park Fed'n of Teachers, No. 94-2777 (C.P. Wash. County Jan. 21, 1994). In Bethel Park,
Judge Friedman ordered the parties, including all 330 members of the Bethel Park Federation of
Teachers, to participate in daily face-to-face negotiations. Id. Further, the court stated that if the
parties did not cooperate, the court would conduct the sessions. Id.
91. See, e.g., Butler Area Sch. Dist. v. Butler Educ. Ass'n, 9 Pa. Pub. Employee Rep. 9039
(Jan. 26, 1978), overruled by, Butler Area Sch. Dist. v. Butler Educ. Ass'n, 9 Pa. Pub. Employee
Rep. 9216 (Sept. 22, 1978); Gulnac v. South Butler County Educ. Ass'n, 2 Pa. D & C 4th 541
(C.P. Butler Co. 1989), rev'd on other grounds by, Gulnac v. South Butler Education Ass'n, 587
A.2d 699 (Pa. 1991); Reichley By Wall v. North Penn Sch. Dist., No. 86-15062 (C.P. Montg. Co.
1986), rev'd, 626 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1993).
92. See cases cited supra note 91. See also Fred Maher, Teachers' Strikes Violate Constitution,
13 PA. L. J. REP. at 1, 10 (Oct. 22, 1990). The Pennsylvania Constitution states that: "The General
Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public
education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
In addition, Leon Hickman, principal author of the 1968 report that led to the enactment of
Act 195, later expressed reservations as to the constitutionality of the act and stated: "The
constitutional right of our children to an education is on a collision course with competing demands
of school teachers for adequate salaries and the need of school boards to balance their budgets
without unacceptable demands upon the taxpayers." Hogler, supra note 5, at 394 n.44.
93. Reichley By Wall v. North Penn Sch. Dist., 626 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1993). See also Butler Area
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In Reichley By Wall v. North Penn School District,94 the supreme
court reversed a trial court order which held Act 195 unconstitutional
insofar as it allowed strikes by public educators.95 The trial court based
its decision on evidence presented by the plaintiffs, a group of students
and parents. The evidence included the disruptive effects of the strike,
such as the need to reschedule lost instructional days, disruption of the
college application process for high school seniors, the negative impact
of lost instructional time on the scholastic achievement of the students,
and lost respect of students and parents for the teachers." The trial
court concluded that rather than promoting harmonious relations between
the public employer and its employees, which was the avowed legislative
purpose of Act 195, the Act actually increased disruption in the school
system. 97 Without deciding whether the trial court's assessments were
accurate, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the legislature, not
the judiciary, was the appropriate body to make such a determination and,
if necessary, to enact corrective legislation. 9
III. Discussion of Act 88
In the twenty-two years since the enactment of Act 195,
Pennsylvania has become known as the teacher strike capital of the
nation. 99 In an effort to control the number and length of teacher strikes
in Pennsylvania, the legislature enacted Act 88," which represents a
compromise of parent, teacher, and school board organizations.' The
Sch. Dist. v. Butler Educ. Ass'n., 9 PA. PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. 1 9216 (Sept 22, 1978).
94. 626 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1993).
95. Id. at 129. Because Act 88 was enacted during the pendency of the appeal, the court
discussed whether the appeal was moot Id. at 126 n.3. The court concluded that, because the right
to strike remained under Act 88, it was necessary to resolve the fundamental question of whether
granting teachers the fight to strike created an impermissible conflict with the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Id.
96. Id. at 128.
97. Id. Moreover, the trial court concluded that Act 195 caused a break down in cooperation
between school districts and teachers by creating an "inefficient confrontation process that works to
no one's advantage." Reichley By Wall, 626 A.2d at 128.
98. Id. The courts stated that "[tihe adversarial judicial system is not an appropriate forum for
analyzing whether... [Act] 195 works well or poorly . I..." ld. at 129. The court further stated
that if a statute does not work as expected the legislature has the competence to weigh the initial
policy considerations, assess the efficacy of the legislation and decide whether or not to change or
continue under the legislation. Id.
99. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text See also 1992 PA. LEGis. J.-Senate, Vol.
2, at 2385 (statements of Senator Greenwood).
100. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text See also 1992 PA. LEoIs. J.-Senate, Vol.
2, at 2385-86 (statements of Senator Greenwood) ("[Act 88] ... will, without doubt, dramatically
reduce the number and length of teacher strikes in Pennsylvania.").
101. 1992 PA. LEols. J.-Senate, Vol. 1, at 1837 (statements of Senator Lincoln). "One of the
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legislature reasoned that by enacting legislation that required a strict,
mandatory timetable of early negotiation and mediation, strikes could be
avoided." 2 Further, the legislature sought to limit the disruptive, effects
of teacher strikes by prohibiting selective strikes.' °3  In 1993,
Pennsylvania suffered its fewest number of teacher strikes in seven
years.' However, whether this fact is attributable to Act 88 is
uncertain since the 1993-94 school year was the first school year to be
fully affected by Act 88. I"'
A. Dispute Resolution Procedures under Act 88
The timelines of Act 88's bargaining scheme are mandatory, not
directive." 6 Further, in an attempt to force an agreement by the end
of the school year, each progressive level of the dispute resolution
process is designed to create pressure on the parties to engage in serious
bargaining.' Initially, the parties may negotiate for a reasonable
period.' If negotiations fail, and an impasse exists, the parties may
voluntarily submit to mediation."' However, if the parties have not
submitted to mediation, and they are unable to reach an agreement within
few times in my career ... that I have seen the PTA, the Pennsylvania School Board Association,
and PSEA write a letter that is signed by all three organizations urging very strong support." Id.
See also 1992 PA. LEois. J.-Senate, Vol. 2, at 2386 (statements of Senator Rhoades) ("PSEA and
PSBA got together and ... worked out an agreement which we accepted... ."); id. (statements of
Senator Fisher) ("All in all, we have a compromise.").
102. 1992 PA. LEGiS. J.-Senate, Vol. 2, at 2385 (statements of Senator Greenwood). See also
1992 Pa. Legis. J.-Senate, Vol. 1, at 1837 (statements of Senator Lincoln) ("[N]egotiations under
Act 195 have never, ever been on time, and this bill sets into place a procedure that will allow for
and force the kind of negotiation that will keep strikes from happening.").
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 11-1171 -A (Supp. 1994). See also 1991 PA. LEGIS. J.-Senate,
Vol. 2, at 1137 (statements of Senator Fisher). Senator Fisher stated,
Since ... [the enactment of Act 195], the incidents of school strikes have continued to
increase. There have been new tactics, tactics like selective strikes which I believe are
clearly intolerable in this Commonwealth. That type of gorilla tactic is one which is very
detrimental to the quality of education which we all support for our children ....
Id.
104. See supra note 27.
105. Interview with Ernest Helling, Assistant Chief Counsel, Department of Education, in
Harrisburg, Pa. (Feb. 16, 1994). But see Dave Ivey, Anti-Strike Law Keeps Teachers off Picket Line,
THE PATRIOT, Sept. 16, 1994, at B4 (crediting Act 88 for decline in strikes).
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 11-1 126-A (Supp. 1994). In contrast, Act 195 contained no
explicit requirement that the deadlines for impasses resolution be followed. Thus, the time periods
in the act were not rigidly followed. Cf City of Philadelphia v. PLRB, 614 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1992)
(denying the PLRB the authority to implement factfinding outside the court defined statutory
window).
107. Mark P. Widoff, Trends and Developments in Pennsylvania Public Employment Law: Act
88 and Related Developments (Mar. 18, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, available from PSEA).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § lI-1121-A(a) (Supp. 1994).
109. Id.
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a specified time after the commencement of negotiations, mandatory
mediation by a third party is required."' Mediation must continue until
the piarties reach an agreement or an impasse."' However, the
mediation process is limited in duration; the parties are considered to
have reached an impasse if no agreement is reached within forty-five
days after the commencement of mediation, or, in no event later than 81
days prior to the end of the school district's fiscal year." 2  If no
agreement is reached through the mediation process, the parties or the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board can impose fact-finding." 3
Act 88 allows one side to unilaterally call for factfinding." 4  In
addition, the parties may mutually agree to fact-finding anytime other
than during mandated final best-offer arbitration."' Further, the PLRB
may implement fact-finding at any other time, except between the notice
of a strike and its conclusion, or during final best-offer arbitration." 6
Finally, although the parties are not required to accept the findings and
recommendations of the fact-finding panel,'" these recommendations
continue to have importance and should be taken seriously because they
may be used as the basis for best-offer arbitration."'
Pursuant to Act 88, either party may request voluntary final best-
offer arbitration, which the other party must refuse or agree to within ten
days."' No strikes or lockouts are permitted during this ten day-
110. Id. Submission to mediation is mandated if the parties have not reached an agreement
"within forty-five (45) days after negotiations have commenced, but in no event later than one
hundred twenty-six (126) days prior to... the end of the school entity's fiscal year." Id. See also
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board ("PLRB"), Proposed Bargaining Procedure Under Senate Bill
727: Act 88 Timetable (delineating the proposed bargaining procedure under Act 88) (on file with
the Dickinson Law Review).
I ll. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 11 -1121-A(a) (Supp. 1994).
112. See id. § 11-1122-A(a)(1). If no agreement is reached by this point, the Bureau of
Mediation is required to notify the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board of the impasse, and of any
party's request for the appointment of a fact-finding panel. Id.
113. Id. § 11-1121-A(a)(2)-(4).
114. Id. § 1l-1122-A(2).
115. Id. § 11-1122-A(a)(4).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122(A)(a)(4) (Supp. 1994).
117. See id. § 11-1122-A(c). If the parties do not accept the panel's findings and
recommendations, the panel is required to publish them. Id.
I18. Widoff, supra note 107, at2. See also, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1123-A (Supp. 1994).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1 125-A(a) (Supp. 1994). Act 88 contemplates that, prior to
utilization of final best-offer arbitration, the parties will have agreed to the acceptance of an
"approved impasse procedure." Id. § l-1 123-A(a). The Act provides:
(a) The parties to a collective bargaining agreement involving public school employees
shall be required to bargain upon the issue of acceptance and adoption of one of the
following approved impasse resolution procedures, with the proviso that such an
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require making a
concession:
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response period. 20 The parties are permitted to agree to voluntary final
best-offer arbitration at any time other than during fact-finding or
mandated final best-offer arbitration.'
In contrast to voluntary final best-offer arbitration, which requires
the agreement of both parties, Act 88 requires mandatory final best-offer
arbitration if a strike or lock-out will otherwise prevent the completion
of 180 instructional days prior to June 15 or the last day of the scheduled
year.' 22  However, despite the designation "mandatory final best-offer
arbitration," the parties are not required to accept the determinations of
the arbitrator. 1
23
The legislature's intent to reduce the number and length of teacher
strikes is further evidenced by the provisions of Act 88 that regulate
strikes and lockouts. First, once the teachers strike and unilaterally return
to work, they may call only one more lawful strike during the school
year.124  Second, after rejection by either party of the arbitrators'
determination, the employer may use strike breakers if the strike prevents
completion of 180 days of instruction.' 2 Third, mandatory cooling-off
periods are imposed upon the parties under certain circumstances. Strikes
and lock-outs must cease for the duration of fact-finding and must end
(1) Arbitration under which the award is confined to a choice among one of the
following single packages:
(i) the last offer of the representative of the employer;
(ii) the last offer of the representative of the employes; or
(iii) the fact-finder's recommendations; should there be a fact-finder's report.
(2) Arbitration under which the award is confined to a choice among one of the
following on an issue by issue basis:
(i) the last offer of the representative of the employer;
(ii) the last offer of the representative of the employes; or
(iii) the fact-finder's recommendations; should there be a fact-finder's report;
(3) Arbitration under which the award is confined to a choice among one of the
following on the basis of economic and noneconomic issues as separate units:
(i) the last offer of the representative of the employer;
(ii) the last offer of the representative of the employes; or
(iii) the fact-finder's recommendations, should there be a fact-finder's report.
Id. If the parties are unable to agree on the adoption of one of these procedures, it is incumbent
upon the mediator appointed under § 11-1121-A to do so. Id. § 11-1 125-A(c).
120. Id. § 11-1125-A(a).
121. Id. § 11-1125A(f).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § Ili 125-A(b) (Supp. 1994).
123. Id. § 11-1125-A(k).
124. Id. § 11-1101-A.
125. Id. § Il-I 172-A(b)(1) & (2). During any strike prior to nonbinding arbitration, school
boards may retain only those substitutes who had been actively employed at some time during the
preceding 12 months. Id. § 11-1 172-A(a). However, if the arbitration award is rejected and a strike
is renewed, there is no restriction of the use of substitutes. Id. §§ 11-1172-A(b)(1) & (2).
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when the parties agree to arbitration. 26 Strikes and lock-outs are also
prohibited during the period in which a party must reject or agree to a
request for arbitration, during final best-offer arbitration, and upon the
arbitrators' determination becoming final and binding.12  Additionally,
selective strikes are prohibited directly by section 1171-A' 28 and
indirectly through the definition of a strike, which includes both partial
and full work stoppages, limits teachers to two strikes during the school
year, and requires that forty-eight hours notice be given for any
strike. 129  Finally, the Secretary of Education is authorized to seek an
injunction when the 180-day rule is in jeopardy. 30 The drafters of Act
88 reasoned that by placing the responsibility of seeking an injunction on
the Secretary of Education, the school board members and local citizens
would be relieved of the onus of seeking injunctive relief.'3'
The legislators hoped that the provisions of Act 88, which include
well-structured timetables for negotiation, an enhanced mediation bureau,
and the opportunity for one side to call for fact-finding, would facilitate
early resolutions of contract disputes. 3 2 However, school districts and
teacher bargaining units have encountered difficulties implementing Act
88, and early results indicate that the Act may not improve or facilitate
the negotiation process. '
B. Problems with the Implementation of Act 88
Thus far, the experience with the operation of Act 88 has been
troubling. Contrary to the goals of the drafters, parties seeking to avoid
the resolution procedures have misused the strict timelines for
negotiations and levels of bargaining in several ways. First, because the
parties are not required to submit to arbitration until a strike or lockout
would prevent completion of 180 instruction days, 34 teachers have used
a "first strike" as a tool to force reluctant school districts into
arbitration.'35 In several cases, however, teachers have avoided using
126. Id. § 11-1131(A).
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1131-A, 11-1132-A (Supp. 1994). The arbitrators'
determination automatically becomes final and binding unless one of the parties considers and rejects
the determination at a "properly convened special or regular meeting" within ten days after receiving
it. See, id. § 1l-1125-A(k).
128. Id. § 11-1171-A.
129. Id. § II-I101-A (defining "strike").
130. Id. § I-I161-A.
131. 1992 PA. LEGIS. J.-Senate, Vol. 1, at 1838 (statements of Senator Lincoln).
132. Id. at 2386 (remarks of Senator Fisher).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 134-65.
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1125-A(b)(l) to (2) (Supp. 1994).
135. Widoff, supra note 107. For example, the Carlisle Area Education Association ("CAEA")
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a "first strike" by calling a "paper strike."'36 Because Act 88 requires
final best-offer arbitration whenever a strike or lockout will prevent the
mandated 180 days of instruction, 37 teachers need only announce the
strike late in the school year, when there are no available make-up days,
to trigger the mandatory arbitration mechanism of Act 88.3 s Thus, by
merely announcing a strike, teachers can force a school district into
arbitration without actually missing a day's work.
Second, in an effort to delay commencement of mediation and fact-
finding, a party can refuse to meet with the mediator prior to the
mandated one hundred twenty-six days before the end of the school
entity's fiscal year. 139  This delay precludes the nondiscretionary
appointment of a fact-finder pursuant to the request of one of the
parties. 4" Further delay and avoidance tactics could include altering
the school's instruction calendar to prevent the "second strike," or
refusing to enter into mandatory best-offer arbitration."'
Third, Act 88 also has changed the dynamics of fact-finding, thereby
lowering the settlement rate."" Under Act 195, the appointment of a
factfinder is discretionary, 4 3 and the PLRB frequently delayed the
appointment of a factfinder until the parties had narrowed the issues. 44
asked the school board to agree to binding or non-binding arbitration, the school board refused and
a strike ensued. Dan Miller, Contract Chronology, THE SENTINEL (Carlisle, PA) Jan. 10, 1994, at
A4. After a three week strike, the parties were forced into non-binding arbitration through the
operation of § 1125-A of Act 88. Pamela Harding, School Arbitration Hearings to be Closed, THE
SENTINEL (Carlisle, PA) Feb. 16, 1994, at B3.
136. Interview with Patricia Crawford, Sec. of PLRB, Harrisburg, PA, Aug. 22, 1994 [hereinafter
Crawford Interview].
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § I1-1 125-A(b) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
138. Lackawanna County Area Vo-Tech Fed. of Teachers Local # 3876 v. Lackawanna County
Area Vo-Tech Sch., No. PERA-C-93-309-E, (C.P. Lackawanna Co. July 26, 1994). In Lackawanna
County, the PLRB stated, "The Union's strike activity on May 5, 1993 ... mandated submission of
this dispute to arbitration without the necessity of even a one-day strike." Id. at 3. In addition the
Board determined that the words "will prevent" mandated arbitration whenever a strike, "whether in
progress or not" would prevent the required 180 days of instruction. Id. at 2.
139. Widoff, supra note 107, at 4.
140. Id. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § I 1-1 22-A(a)(2) (Supp. 1994) (stating that either
party may request the board to appoint a fact-finding panel no later than 81 days prior to June 30
or Dec. 3 1, whichever is the end of the school entity's fiscal year).
141. Widoff, supra note 107, at 4.
142. Crawford Interview, supra note 136. From 1985-1992,47% ofthe cases were either settled
without a factfinders' report or both parties accepted the report. Id. Frequently, the parties settled
their dispute using the factfinders' guidelines. Id. In contrast, only 35% of the 114 cases presented
under Act 88 were settled pursuant to the factfinders' guidelines. Id.
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802(2) (1991).
144. Crawford Interview, supra note 136. Prior to 1992, factfinding was used relatively
infrequently. Id. From 1985-1992, factfinders were used in an average of 16 cases per year. Id.
Under Act 88, factfinders are used more frequently. Id.
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In those cases, because the factfinder was appointed after the parties had
explored and exhausted their options, the parties frequently settled the
dispute pursuant to the factfinders' guidelines.'45 Thus, factfinding was
viewed as a valuable means of settling disputes.146 In contrast, under
Act 88, the parties enter into the factfinding process earlier and often
have not had an opportunity to adequately qualify the issues.' 47  The
distance between the parties at the outset of factfinding restricts the
ability of the factfinder to assist the parties in reaching an agreement
within the forty days allotted under the Act. 48  Moreover, in some
cases, the parties view factfinding merely as a required procedural step
rather than an effective bargaining tool. Consequently, although the
timelines of Act 88 are adhered to in a majority of cases149 and
factfinding is used more frequently,' 5° the settlement rate is lower under
Act 88. "'
Fourth, arbitration does not proceed as the drafters intended because
the parties generally do not adhere to the timeline, and arbitration is
rarely concluded in the amount of time prescribed by the Act.' Under
Act 88, the first arbitration hearing must begin within ten days after the
selection of the arbitration panel.' Then, within twenty days after the
conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrators must issue the award.'54 The
parties may either accept or reject the award within ten days.'"
Problems arise because the timeline does not include a specified time
limit for the first arbitration hearing, and the arbitrators frequently extend
the hearing until they have reached a consensus. 56 Thus, arbitration is
rarely concluded in the forty days designated by the Act.
Finally, because Act 88 does not require mandatory binding
arbitration, it lacks the teeth necessary to force dispute resolution.
Indeed, because it is nonbinding,5  mandatory final best-offer
145. Crawford Interview, supra note 136.
146. Crawford Interview, supra note 136.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
148. Crawford Interview, supra note 136; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1 122-A(b) (Supp. 1994)
(stating that "[tihe findings of fact and recommendations shall be sent ... to the board and to both
parties not more than forty (40) days after the Bureau of Mediation has notified the board [that the
parties have reached an impasse]").
149. Crawford Interview, supra note 136.
150. Crawford Interview, supra note 136.
151. See supra note 142.
152. Crawford Interview, supra note 136.
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1 125-A(i) (Supp. 1994).
154. Id. § 11-1125-Aaj)(l)-(3).
155. Id. § 11-1125-A(k).
156. Crawford Interview, supra note 136.
157. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1125-A(k) (Supp. 1994).
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arbitration is futile since the party whose proposal was rejected can, and
frequently does, reject the arbitration award. 5' The drafters of Act 88,
recognizing this fact, clearly wanted to include mandatory binding
arbitration in the legislation.'59 However, because Act 88 was a
compromise, 160 compulsory mandatory binding arbitration was deleted
from the final bill, and the resolution process lacks finality.
As a result of this lack of finality, the parties can strictly adhere to
the timeline of negotiations and still not reach a contract resolution within
the school year. This results in a "holdover" contract situation.
16'
158. Since the enactment of Act 88, 18 cases went through voluntary arbitration and 27 cases
went through mandatory arbitration. Crawford Interview, supra note 136. The 18 cases involving
voluntary arbitration were resolved as follows: 2 cases were rejected by the union, 1 case was
rejected by both parties, I case is not yet concluded, 2 cases were settled by the arbitrators prior to
the issuance of an award, and the remaining 12 cases were rejected by the public employer.
Crawford Interview, supra note 136. The 27 cases involving mandatory arbitration were resolved
as follows: 4 cases were rejected by the union, 2 cases were rejected by both sides, 6 cases were not
yet concluded, 3 cases neither side rejected, and the remaining 12 cases were rejected by the public
employer. Crawford Interview, supra note 136. See also Dan Miller, Arbitration Doesn't Ensure
Contract, THE SENTINEL (Carlisle, PA), Jan. 25, 1994, at Al, A4. John E. Slattery, Superintendent
of Penn Ridge School District, contends that arbitrators' hands are tied by Act 88 and that neither
side takes the process seriously since either one can reject the arbitrators' recommendation. Id.
159. See 1992 PA. LEGIs. J.-Senate, Vol. 1, at 1840 (statements of Senator Greenwood).
Senator Greenwood stated:
[W]hen this bill left the Senate last October with a unanimous vote, it was a very
different bill than it is now. The most important difference between this bill when it left
the Senate and when it came back from the House is that when it left the Senate it
allowed a school district to unilaterally bring about binding arbitration. [ I When this bill
was amended ... it was... completely watered down and [the amendment] reduced our
opportunity to prevent strikes, because the House changed the bill so that you only have
binding arbitration when both parties agree.
Id. See also 1992 PA. LEGIS J.-Senate, Vol. 2, at 2386 (statements of Senator Rhoades) (stating
that he favored last best offer binding arbitration).
160. See supra text accompanying note 101. Mutual concession, however, was not the only
reason that binding arbitration was deleted from the original version of Act 88. The initial draft of
Act 88 eliminated the right to strike for teachers and instead provided for mandatory final best offer
arbitration. Patricia Crawford, Pennsylvania's Bargaining Law for School Employees Act of 1992,
45 LAB. L. 475, 476 (Aug. 1994). This version, however, was rejected as unconstitutional. Id.
The Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from delegating the power to "make,
supervise or interfere with" governmental obligations including those relating to "money, property
or effects ... or to levy taxes ...." PA. CONST. art. III, § 31. Thus, legislation which required
mandatory binding arbitration for teacher contracts would require a constitutional amendment Id.
See also Act 88: A Progress Report, 9 PSBA (1994) (stating that constitutional amendments must
be passed in two successive sessions of the General Assembly and approved by a statewide voter
referendum). Although it is clearly more difficult and time-consuming to amend the Pennsylvania
Constitution prior to passing a statute, it is unclear why the Legislature failed to attempt an
amendment, especially since the Pennsylvania citizens were dissatisfied with the high number of
teacher strikes.
161. A hold-over bargaining situation occurs when the parties have utilized the impasse
resolution procedures of mediation, fact-finding and final best-offer arbitration and no agreement has
been reached at the conclusion of the first school year. Widoff, supra, note 107, at 4.
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Because the drafters did not provide for a "holdover" bargaining
situation,'62 theoretically, the parties need only stand their ground and
start a second or third year of bargaining under Act 88 resolution
procedures. However, whether the timeline begins anew or continues into
the following school year in a holdover situation is uncertain. The
Pennsylvania School Board Association argues that the timeline simply
continues into the next school year.' Pennsylvania State Education
Association (PSEA) contends that Act 88 resets itself, which would allow
teachers to begin each school year with a strike.' For example,
teachers could engage in a "first strike" one year; and, if the dispute was
unresolved by the beginning of the next school year, they could engage
in a "second strike" until the 180-day requirement was threatened. Their
right to strike would then be exhausted for that year. This scenario could
continue indefinitely. Certainly, this result is contrary to the intentions
of the legislature because it neither facilitates finality in negotiations nor
reduces the number and length of strikes. 65
IV. Recommendations for Improving Labor Relations Between the
Public Employer and Teachers and Decreasing Teacher Strikes
For several decades, teacher strikes have caused disruption in the
Pennsylvania school systems, and yet, there has been no legislation to
date that adequately addresses the problem. Neither Act 195 nor Act 88
accomplished the legislature's goals of improving relations between the
public employer and its employees and decreasing the number of strikes.
Consequently, this section suggests several ways to improve labor
relations between school districts and teachers so as to decrease the
number of strikes.
162. The legislature never considered the consequences of a dispute not being settled after one
year. Crawford Interview, supra note 136. Consequently, parties may go through multiple
factfindings if the dispute is unresolved at the end of the first school year. Crawford Interview, supra
note 136. See also P. Crawford, Pennsylvania's Bargaining Law for School Employees Act of 1992,
45 LAB. L.J. 475, 477 (Aug. 1994) (stating that because Act 88 is more process oriented, the
bargaining cycle may repeat itself resulting in multiple fact-finding and arbitration procedures).
163. Crawford Interview, supra note 136. The significance of arguing for a continuing timeline
is that after the initial strike, the public employer is permitted unrestricted use of strikebreakers
pursuant to § 1172(b)(1) & (2). Id.
164. See Widoff, supra note 107, at 4.
165. Senator Rhoades argued for a timeline which included last best-offer binding arbitration by
June Ist of the school year and stated that without binding arbitration negotiations would be
prolonged and strikes would continue. 1992 PA. LEGis. J.-Senate, Vol. 2, at 2386 (statements of
Senator Rhoades).
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A. Impose Economic Sanctions on the Parties
Imposing economic sanctions similar to those experienced in the
private sector may decrease the number of strikes. In the private sector,
employees who strike suffer an immediate consequence, no salary.'66
Employers also suffer adverse consequences such as interruption of
business operations, decrease in cash flow, and customer dissatisfaction.
These consequences provide a strong incentive to both parties to consider
reconciliation. In the public school sector such economic realities are not
as apparent. Although teachers are not paid for strike days,
167
eventually they are paid since the missed days must be made up.
Therefore, because teachers suffer limited adverse economic impact when
they strike, they have less incentive than private employees to resolve
disputes without striking. 68  Similarly, the school district suffers no
adverse impact, including lost state subsidies because strikes can be
enjoined whenever the 180-day requirement is threatened. 69  If both
parties suffered economic hardship similar to that experienced by private
employers and employees, there might be fewer strikes. To facilitate
dispute resolution, the teachers should lose pay for the days missed
because of the strike, and the district should lose a portion of its subsidy.
However, drafting appropriate legislation to impose economic
sanctions would require a difficult balancing of financial constraints and
sound educational policy. Although a statute that provided that strike
days could not be made up would penalize teachers, such a statute might
hamper educational goals because students would have less classroom
time. Likewise, if the statute imposed monetary penalties upon school
districts for failing to meet the 180-day requirement, the districts would
be at the mercy of the teachers during bargaining. Districts would be
forced to give in to teacher demands or lose money that is necessary to
operate the schools efficiently. Moreover, a statute that would require
teachers to make up missed days without pay could be held
166. See Duer Spring and Mfg. Co. v. Pennsylvania Dept of Labor and Indus., 906 F.2d 968
(3d Cir. 1990). In addition, Pennsylvania law provides that an employee is ineligible for
unemployment compensation if his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work resulting from a labor
dispute other than a lock-out by the employer. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(d) (1991).
167. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1006 (1991).
168. See 1991 PA. LEGIS. J.-House, Vol. 2, at 1933-1934 (statements of Mr. Gamble).
However, teachers may lose money if their district requires more than 180 days of instruction. For
example, if the school district normally requires 186 days and, because of a strike, the school year
runs for only 180 days, the teachers lose 6 days of pay which will not be made up. In addition, even
if the teachers suffer no adverse economic impact when they strike, there are other adverse
repercussions to be considered such as fostering anti-teacher sentiment in the community or forcing
teachers to restructure their summer plans.
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 11-1 161-A (Supp. 1994).
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unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against
involuntary servitude. 7 °  Ultimately, the legislature must decide
whether imposing economic sanctions on the teachers and school districts,
which might compromise educational goals, is a reasonable way to
decrease the number and length of strikes.' 7'
Neither allowing strikes to proceed with only limited adverse
economic impact on the parties nor imposing economic sanctions that
might sacrifice educational goals is an attractive alternative. Either
solution disrupts and compromises the educational system. Such a no
win situation undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that teacher strikes in
public schools should be prohibited." Indeed, Pennsylvania is only
one of seven states that permits teachers to strike.' Given the current
political realities, however, a bill prohibiting teacher strikes7 4 most
likely would not have enough support to pass, unless coupled with
compulsory arbitration.
170. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII, § 1.
171. Opponents of the policy of allowing teacher strikes contend that more money and higher
teacher salaries do not produce a better education system. Baird, supra note 12, at 29 (citing U.S.
Department of Education, Sixth Annual State Education Performance Chart, Released May 3, 1989).
However, this argument may be overstated. According to the U.S. Department of Education,
Pennsylvania students have consistently performed below the national average on the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) since 1982, despite the fact that teacher salaries have increased steadily. Id.
However, these figures may not be an indication that the quality of education is declining. The
decrease in performance on the SAT could be attributed to other factors such as the fact that more
students from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds now take the test. The Top Censored Stories
of 1993: Good News is No News: A Major Study on Public Education Ignored, UTNE READER,
May/June 1994, at 42. A recent 'study by Sandia National Laboratories gave American schools
generally good marks, noting that the United States has one of highest high school completion rates
(85%) of any nation. Id. at 42-44 (citing School Choice: Its Time Has Come, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Oct. 18, 1993). The report also corrected the misconception that spending on public
education has skyrocketed in recent years, noting that nearly all the increase has gone to special
education programs, not regular classrooms. Id. at 44 (citing Robert M. Huelskamp, The Second
Coming of the Sandia Report, Pin DELTA KAPPAN, 4-8 May, 1993).
172. See supra note 21. See also 1991 PA. LEGIS. J.-Senate Vol. 2, at 873. Senator Rhoades,
by unanimous consent, offered an amendment to proposed Senate Bill 727 which prohibited strikes
and provided for a state panel of arbitration for education. Id.
173. National Education Ass'n., Collective Bargaining Laws for Education Employees (Jan. 7,
1993) (available from PSEA). Currently, the states which grant teachers a limited right to strike
include Pennsylvania, Alaska, Hawaii, Ohio, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id.
174. It is interesting to note that there is some evidence that despite having the right to strike,
education employees in Pennsylvania have done significantly worse with respect to salaries since the
enactment of Act 195. Baird, supra note 12, at 28 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, Public
Employment). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, salaries of Pennsylvania government
employees increased more in the years 1965-69, before Act 195, than they did in either 1970-79 or
1981-86. Id.
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B. Restructure Public School Funding
A more equitable method of taxation to support public schools might
facilitate smoother contract negotiations and improve the quality of
education. Public schools are largely financed through property taxes,
which are fixed by the school board.' Therefore, a direct correlation
exists between teacher salaries and local property taxes. Frequently,
property owners do not have children in the school system and, thus,
have no direct stake in the quality of education in the school system. As
a result, these owners resist higher taxes and pressure school boards to
minimize teacher salary and benefit increases.' 7' Consequently, school
boards are reluctant to meet teacher demands, thereby protracting contract
negotiations and forcing teachers to strike.
Some states have enacted tax reform legislation that reduces school
districts' reliance on property taxes with the hopes of bringing about
fairer financing in the public schools. In Michigan, for example, the
Legislature abolished two-thirds of local property taxes that went toward
the schools and offered voters a choice between two different versions of
tax reform.' Ultimately, the voters chose a sales tax increase, which
included a 50-cent rise in the cigarette tax, and virtually ended the
practice of financing schools through a property tax."' Likewise, by
175. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6-555 (1992).
176. Some Pennsylvania taxpayers' opinions toward teacher requests for higher salaries are
reflected by the group, Carlisle Area Taxpayers for Quality Education, which counter-picketed the
striking Carlisle teachers. Rich Lewis, Taxpayer Group Counter-pickets at SchooLs, THE SENTINEL
(Carlisle, PA), Jan. 3, 1994, at Al. Dave Adams, a member of the group, stated that the school
board was trying to reflect the opinion of the majority of the taxpayers in its refusal to grant teacher
contract demands. Id. Adams also stated that he and the members of the group are angry that
teachers are seeking substantial pay hikes at a time when the local tax base is shrinking. Id. In
addition, he also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that teachers only work eight or nine months
of the year. Id. But see Rich Lewis, Parent Group Pickets, THE SEwinNEL (Carlisle, PA), Jan. 10,
1994, at Al. A citizen group, Parents for Quality Education, attempted to recall members of the
Carlisle Area School Board and blamed the board for the teachers' strike. Id. A member of the
group stated that the board was wrong to resist raising teachers' salaries because young people would
not be attracted to the profession if they were unable to make a living. Id.
177. Michigan Schools: First Lessons in Equity, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 1994, at 26. One
proposal included raising state sales tax from 4% to 6%, lowering state income tax from 4.6% to
4.4%, cutting property tax by an average of five-sixths, imposing a 2% property transfer tax, and
raising tax on cigarettes from 25 cents to 75 cents per pack. Id. Another proposal included raising
income tax to 6%, cutting property tax by two-thirds, imposing a 1% property transfer tax, raising
business tax, and raising tax on cigarettes from 25 cents to 40 cents per pack. Id. at 36 & 31.
Michigan's plan, which has been praised as a model for other states, also established minimum
per-pupil spending levels and capped the sum that wealthier districts could spend on their schools.
Laura Laughlin, State Pursues Fairer School Funding Plan; Solution to Inequities Will. Test
Lawmakers, THE PHoENIX GAzEnZ Sept. 23, 1994, at Al.
178. See id. Although democratic politicians and union leaders opposed the accepted sales tax
increase proposal, most of the money used in advertising campaigns against the sales tax increase
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adopting a more equitable method of funding in Pennsylvania, taxpayers
might be less inclined to resist teachers' attempts to raise their salaries
which, in effect, might reduce the number of strikes.
C. Require Teachers to Work for the Entire Year
Extending the school year into the summer months 79 would
enhance the achievement of education goals, justify teacher salaries, and
reduce taxpayer resentment toward teachers. Pennsylvania's economy
today does not justify giving teachers and students the summer off.
Originally, the agrarian nature of our society demanded that students not
attend school during the summer months so that they could work on their
parents' farms.' Although Pennsylvania still has a largely agricultural
economy, mechanization and paid employees have replaced child labor.
In addition to being unnecessary, giving children the summer off
imposes a burden on the school system and parents. Summers off are a
burden for the school system because students' skills decrease during the
summer, which necessitates extensive remediation the following school
year. '' Likewise, because most parents must work during the summer
months, children either spend large amounts of time unsupervised at
home, or parents must pay for sitters or camps. Further, summers off
create significant taxpayer resentment toward teachers. 2 Unlike most
employees in the private sector, teachers receive thirteen weeks
vacation - ten weeks in the summer and three during the school
year. '3 Because of this seemingly inordinate amount of vacation time,
came from the tobacco industry. Id. Using a clever strategy that helped to pass the proposal,
Governor John Engler linked opposition to the sales tax increase to coddling with the tobacco
industry. Id.
179. Year-round school has been implemented in a majority of states. Suzanne Cassidy, Year-
round Classes Pondered, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, July 17, 1994, at Al. According to Don Jeffries,
program specialist for the National Association for Year-Round Education in San Diego, 366 districts
in 33 states have one or more schools with a year-round calendar. Id. Indeed, a Harrisburg
elementary school is considering adopting a year-round schedule. Id. Advocates for the proposal,
which will be implemented at the Ben Franklin Academic Prep School, contend that year-round
education will be beneficial for the following reasons: (i) increased hours of education are
imperative if Americans are to remain competitive in the global marketplace; (2) extensive
remediation of students who are returning to school in the fall will not be necessary; (3) student and
teacher burnout will decrease because the proposed calendar has more frequent short breaks; and (4)
summer classes are a "safer and more enriching" alternative to students who may otherwise have
large amounts of unsupervised time on their hands. Id.
180. Cassidy, supra note 179. Dr. Carolyn Carter, principal for Ben Franklin Academy Prep
School, noted that the traditional August-to-June calendar dates to a time when children needed
summers off so that they could work on family farms. Id.
181. See supra text accompanying note 179.
182. See supra text accompanying note 176.
183. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (1992). Based on a five-day school week and
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taxpayers resent teachers' demands for higher pay."8 4 Consequently,
elected school board officials are reluctant to meet teacher salary
demands, which results in protracted contract negotiations and strikes.
V. Conclusion
Teacher strikes in Pennsylvania have been a problem since the late
1950's. In response to the problem the legislature enacted Act 195 in
1972."85 However, because strikes continued and the judiciary
inconsistently applied the law, this Act proved to be ineffective. In an
effort to address the inadequacies of Act 192, the Legislature enacted Act
88 in 1992.186
Although the effectiveness of Act 88 has yet to be determined,
several problems are already apparent. First, the resolution procedures
are misused by the parties, which results in coercive tactics and protracted
contract negotiations.' 7 Second, the Act does not require binding
mandatory arbitration, and strikes still occur if the parties fail to reach an
agreement. " Third, the timeline of Act 88 does not provide for
finality in the dispute resolution process. This results in a "holdover"
bargaining situation whereby contract negotiations and the threat of a
strike continue indefinitely from one school year to the next.'89
Solving the problem of teacher strikes in Pennsylvania will be
difficult. Powerful lobby groups pressure the legislature with competing
interests. Consequently, all legislation to date has been the product of
compromise and has lacked the teeth necessary to address the problem
adequately. Additionally, because labor relations in the public school
sector differ from those in the private sector, labor relation tools which
may be effective in the private sector are not as effective in the public
arena. Finally, it may be difficult to implement alternative solutions such
as restructuring public school funding or eliminating summers off since
they are radical departures from the status quo. Nonetheless, such
alternatives are much more attractive than facing the continued threat of
future teacher strikes.
allowing one week for in-service time, the 180-day requirement equates to approximately 37 weeks
of school for teachers and 13 weeks off.
184. See supra note 176.
185. Public Employe Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 195, 1970 PA. LAWS 563 (codified as amended
at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.100 to .2301 (1991)).
186. Public School Code, Pub. L. No. 88, 1992 PA. LAws 403 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1 101-A to 11-1172-A (Supp. 1994)).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 135, 139, 141, and 163.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.

